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A SURVEY OF THE OHIO COURTS'
APPLICATION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE-FORTIFYING THE SHIELD FOR
CORPORATE DIRECTORS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ohio courts .have traditionally granted considerable deference to

directors of Ohio corporations who make good faith business decisions,'
even when a director has a conflict of interest in the underlying transaction. The state's application of the common law business judgment
rule recognizes that many important corporate decisions are made

under conditions of uncertainty and prevents courts from imposing liability on the basis of judicial hindsight.' The rule provides broad pa-

rameters within which Ohio directors can act without the fear of liability for actions in the sphere of their official conduct.
The result of this principle is that absent fraud, abuse of discretion

or bad faith, Ohio courts will defer to the judgment of corporate directors who exercise their best business judgment regarding questions facing the board. Ohio recognizes that directors of a corporation have an
obligation to the corporation which is of a fiduciary nature.'
Directors generally have two separate duties to the corporation:
the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.4 In Ohio, as long as these
duties are fulfilled, corporate directors will be protected by the business
judgment rule and will not face liability for their actions, whether the
outcomes of their decisions are beneficial or detrimental to the

corporation.
Like the majority of states, Ohio has statutorily defined the duty

1. See Sims v. Street R.R., 37 Ohio St. 556 (1882); Wadsworth v. Davis, 13 Ohio St. 123,
131 (1862)("when [the judgment of the director is] exercised in good faith, those whom they
represent, must, of course, be bound thereby."); Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 71
Ohio L. Abs. 205, 130 N.E.2d 442 (C.P. 1954), affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
163 Ohio St. 606, 128 N.E.2d 16 (1955); Roderick v. Canton Hog Ranch Co., 46 Ohio App. 475,
189 N.E. 669 (1933).
2. Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 257 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986).
3. See id.; Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 361 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Ohio 1973), vacated
in part and remanded, 498 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1974), afid in part, modified in part and remanded. 625 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1980); Nienaber v. Katz, 69 Ohio App. 153, 43 N.E.2d 322
(1942).
4. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985); see also The Corporate Directors Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591,
1599-1600 (1978).
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of care owed by corporate directors.5 A director must perform his duties "in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. '"
The validity of transactions where a director's duty of loyalty is called
into question is similarly defined by statute.
While the Ohio common law business judgment rule was plainly
deferential, the 1986 statutory amendment placed even less of a burden
on directors in justifying their actions and increased the plaintiffs burden in alleging a breach of duty by corporate directors.' Ohio holds a
director liable for damages only if clear and convincing evidence establishes that he had a deliberate intent to cause the corporation injury or

5. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1990).
6. Id. Other state statutes that follow this duty of care include: ALA. CODE § 10-2A-74
(1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-101 (1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 33-313 (West Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.111 (West 1977 & Supp.
1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-830 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-35 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 231-35-1 (Burns Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.830 (West Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:91 (West 1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 716 (West Supp. 1987); MD. CORPS
& Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.1 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West Supp.
1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1541(a) (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.251,
302A.361 (West 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-401 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293A:35 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35
(1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 715, 717 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT § 55-8-30 (1989);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-33 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §
33-8-420 (Law. Co-op. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
23B.08.300 (Supp. 1990).
7. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.60(A)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1990).
No contract, action, or transaction shall be void or voidable with respect to a corporation for the reason that it is between or affects the corporation and one or more of its
directors or officers, or between or affects the corporation and. any other person in which
one or more of its directors or officers are directors, trustees, or officers, or have a financial
or personal interest, or for the reason that one or more interested directors or officers participate in or vote at the meeting of the directors or a committee of the directors that
authorizes such contract, action, or transaction, if in any such case any of the following
apply: (a) The material facts as to his or their relationship or interest and as to the contract, action, or transaction are disclosed or are known to the directors or committee and
the directors or committee, in good faith reasonably justified by such facts, authorizes the
contract, action, or transaction by the affirmative vote of a majority of the disinterested
directors, even though the disinterested directors constitute less than a quorum of the directors or committee;. (b) The material facts as to his or their relationship or interest and as to
the contract, action, or transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled
to vote thereon and the contract, action, or transaction is specifically approved at a meeting
of shareholders held for such purpose by the affirmative vote of the holders of shares entitling them to exercise a majority of the voting power of the corporation held by persons not
interested in the contract, action, or transaction; or (c) The contract, action, or transaction
is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized or approved by the directors, a
committee of the directors, or the shareholders.
Id.
8. H. 902, 1986 Ohio Legs. Serv. 5-693 (Baldwin).
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if he acted (or failed to act) "with reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation." 9
"The basic policy underpinning of the business judgment rule is
that corporate law should encourage and afford broad protection to,
informed business judgments (whether subsequent events prove the
judgments right or wrong) in order to stimulate risk taking, innovation,
and other creative entrepreneurial activities." 10 Directors should be
given wide latitude to manage a corporation, "provided always that
their judgment, and that means an honest, unbiased judgment, is reasonably exercised by them;" courts "presuppose[] that judgment-reasonable diligence-has in fact been exercised" by corporate
directors."
This is no more than judicial recognition that. courts are illequipped to evaluate business decisions and that corporate directors are
more able and qualified to determine what is in the best interests of the
corporation they serve. Directors who have acted competently, diligently and carefully with respect to business decisions should not have
to worry about litigation, whether the outcome of their decision was
beneficial or detrimental to the corporation. 2 Good faith, without evidence of fraud or illegality, has a prophylactic effect on courts interfering with directors and their business decisions.1 3
This comment surveys the Ohio courts' application of the business
judgment rule to directors of Ohio corporations, incorporating both
statutory and common law interpretations. The survey incorporates the
courts' application of the duties of care and loyalty. It examines the
Ohio courts' acquiescence to the business judgment of corporate directors and the courts' refusal to interfere in corporate governance in all
but extreme cases of fraud, abuse of discretion or bad faith.

9. Id. § 1701.59(D).
10. A.L.I., supra note 4, at 2.
11. 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039 (rev.
perm. ed. 1986).
12. One court set out the philosophy of the business judgment rule this way: "a reasoned
decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a background of
perfect knowledge." Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1985). A commentator phrased it this way: "Directors merely undertake to make honest use of
such judgment as they possess. They do not insure the correctness of their judgment; and they
cannot be charged with the consequences of an honest error of judgment or accidental mistake in
the exercise of their discretionary powers." I V. MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 553 (2d ed. 1886).
13. See Hinsey, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 609-13
(1984); Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for
Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477 (1984); Veasey, New Insights into Judicial Deference to Directors'
Business Decisions: Should We Trust the Courts?, 39 Bus. LAW. 1461 (1984).
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE

In Sims v. Street Railroad Co.,'" the Brooklyn Street Railroad
Company (an Ohio corporation) through its board of directors, resolved
to dispose of $8,250 of its capital stock to the company president (who
was also a director) because the company was facing extreme financial
difficulties and was cut off from a connection with another local railroad.15 This sale was approved only after the board made unsuccessful
outside efforts to sell the stock." Other stockholders then filed suit to
enjoin this share disposition, alleging that it was "a fraudulent plot or
scheme to promote the interest of [the president]."' 7
The court declined to intervene on behalf of the shareholders and
instead determined that when directors act within the scope of their
powers, their will should govern unless fraud or breach of trust is
demonstrated, a requirement which was not met in this case.' 8 The
board's decision that the sale of the capital stock to the president was
in the best interests of the corporation therefore stood.' 9
Roth v. St. ClairBldg. & Loan Co.2" applied the ruling of Sims to
negate a shareholder challenge to the decision of a building association's board of directors to sell four of its properties to four board
members during the course of liquidation.2" Once again, the court accepted the board's decision and refused to intervene on behalf of the
shareholders.2 2
The transactions in Roth, in the absence of unfairness or bad
faith, were entirely within the powers of the board of directors. 23 The
court acknowledged that the directors bore a "strict and naked relation"' 24 to the stockholders, but it also noted that. the real estate sales
received the approval of the entire membership of the board (eleven
directors). 2 5 Thus, the votes of the other members would have been sufficient even if the purchasing directors had not cast their votes.
The common law principles set forth in Sims and Roth were ap-

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

37 Ohio St. 556 (1882).
Id. at 558.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 556.
13 Ohio Dec. 154 (1902).
Id.
Id. at 156-57.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 156.
Id.
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plied to corporate directors in Ohio into the twentieth century. 6 They
established the boundaries within which corporate directors could act
and demonstrated the Ohio courts' reluctance to intervene in corporate
decisional affairs. If a corporate decision of the board was fair and beneficial to the corporation in all respects, the court did not set aside the
decision.2 7 The antithesis of this, was, where the director decision is
unfair and detrimental .to the corporation. For example, in Callahan v.
Owen Steel Crane Co.,2" the court subordinated the directors' judgment
to its own. In Callahan, the court substituted its judgment for that of
the directors of the Owen Steel Crane Company to bar the sale of treasury stock to one of the directors.2 9 The court interceded for several
reasons: (1) no efforts were made to sell the stock to others; (2) cash
offers were received from other parties but refused by the board;
(3)"[t]he financial condition of the company was such that additional
capital was not necessary;" and (4) inadequate consideration was re30
ceived for the stock.
The court determined that the benefits of the sale of the stock
were for the recipient of the stock and that the transaction was not
bona fide nor beneficial to the company in any respect.3 1 The transaction appeared "to have been such an abuse of the trust reposed in the
board as warrant[ed] the interference of the chancellor." 2
These early cases concentrated on the effect of the directors' business decisions on the corporation and the method by which directors
arrived at those decisions. It became clear that Ohio courts would
maintain a "hands off" policy with respect to "clean hands" transactions approved by the board that served to benefit the corporation.
The common law standard was further articulated in Goff v.
Emde,3 3 decided in 1928, where an Ohio court of appeals echoed the

26. See Roderick v. Canton Hog Ranch Co., 46 Ohio App. 475, 189 N.E. 669 (1933);
Cooper v. Central Alloy Steel Corp., 43 Ohio App. 455, 183 N.E. 439 (1931); Commercial Banking & Trust Co. v. Tenants' Realty Co., 37 Ohio App. 566, 175 N.E. 36 (1930).
27. See, e.g., In re General Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litigation, 726 F.2d 1075, 1083 (6th
Cir.)(Ohio courts in applying "the business judgment rule, preclud[e] unnecessary judicial interference with the decision of an independent disinterested corporate committee to forgo litigation of
derivative claims."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984); Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp. 625 F.
Supp. 146, 152 (S.D. Ohio 1985)("We decline to second guess the directors of Nationwide as to
the stated purpose for the merger .
), rev'd on other grounds, 826 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); Holmstrom v. Coastal Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 963, 966
(N.D. Ohio 1984) ("A business judgment of the corporate directors will not be set aside absent a
showing of 'fraud, abuse of discretion or bad faith.' ").
28. 41 Ohio C.C. Dec. 183 (1912).
29. Id. at 184.
30. Id. at 186.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 32 Ohio App. 216, 220, 167 N.E. 699, 700 (1928).
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state's previous position of deference to corporate directors' who comply
with a standard of ordinary care and good faith in making corporate
decisions:
The degree of care to be exercised by the officers of a corporation in the
performance of their duties is that which ordinarily prudent men would
exercise under similar circumstances in like employments having regard
to the uses of business and the circumstances of each case. In general
they are not liable in the absence of fraud or intentional breach of .trust
for negligence or mistakes of judgment, and where they have not profited
personally by their bad management or appropriated any of the property
of the corporation to their own use, courts of equity treat them with
indulgence. 4
The Goff litigation arose out of the financial demise of the Cleveland Discount Company during the late 1920s.11 Plaintiff shareholders
alleged that the corporation's downfall was directly attributable to the
negligence of two directors of the corporation."6 The directors were not
charged with any fraudulent conduct or with any wanton or intentional
wrongdoing, and there was no evidence to establish such conduct. 37 The
shareholders' claims were based strictly on negligence.3 8 The court refused to impose liability where reasonable care, diligence and good
faith were exercised. The directors were not liable because the corporation's losses resulted from mere errors of judgment.39
The court not only presumed but expected the directors to deal
with the corporate property and conduct the business of the corporation
with prudence and good faith:
directors of corporations occupy a responsible and importaht business relation to the general public; ...[a] position of trust and responsibility
. .They have assumed the duty to properly, intelligently, and honestly
as will be for
conduct all the corporate affairs in such a way and manner
40
the best interests of the stockholders and all concerned.
The Goff court returned judgment for the defendant directors and reinforced Ohio's non-interventionist stance toward corporate directors and
their decisions.4 1 This decision confirmed the protection afforded direc-

34. Id. at 221, 167 N.E. at 700-01 (citing S.

THOMPSON & J. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES
1520 (3d ed. 1927)).
217, 167 N.E. at 699.
218, 167 N.E. at 700.
222, 167 N.E. at 701.
217, 167 N.E. at 700.
220, 167 N.E. at 700.
220-21, 167 N.E. at 700.
223, 167 N.E. at 701; see also McDonald v. Medical Mutual of Cleveland, Inc.,
158, 163, 324 N.E.2d 785, 789 (1974) (indicating that only with "great reluc-

ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
41 Ohio

Id. at
Id. at
id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Misc.
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tors which the courts established in earlier cases.
These early cases concentrated on the duty of care owed by corporate directors to their corporations. The cases often held that a director's fiduciary duty went beyond that of reasonable care; but, it was not
until 1942, in Nienaber v. Katz,2 that Ohio courts made a significant
holding with respect to a corporate director's duty of loyalty owed to
the corporation.
Nienaber arose out of a debt owed by The Gruen Watch Company
to various banks. 3 As part of a number of contracts with the banks to
relieve the company of the debt, three directors agreed to use their best
efforts to manage the company so as to repay the debt. "4 In exchange,
the directors were to receive stock that had been deposited in escrow
accounts indirectly benefitting the banks as part of earlier agreements.4 5 Although all other agreements regarding the debt were
presented to shareholders for ratification, the directors best efforts
agreement with the banks was concealed.' 6 The plaintiff shareholders
brought suit alleging that this secrecy breached the duty of loyalty and
that the secret profit obtained by the directors in the form of stock was
at the expense of the corporation.'"
The directors prevailed because there was no actual breach of
duty; the subject matter of the contract had "nothing to do with the
assets of The Gruen Watch Company.' '48 In distinguishing the directors' contract from other contracts regarding the corporation's debt, the
court said:
The corporation and its stockholders did not own in any way the time
and services of [the directors]. The banks bargained with [the directors]
for their service, because they had the power to give or withhold. Neither
the corporation nor its stockholders had that power.
As long as [the directors] continued to act as Officers and directors
of The Gruen Watch Company, it was entitled to their individual loyalty, and if they had contracted to give any part of that duty to the
banks to the detriment of the corporation, a liability would exist, but
there is no such claim.' 9
The court further noted "that the fact of profit to the officers or

tance" would the court impose its judgment upon the board of trustees of Medical Mutual).
42. 69 Ohio App. 153, 43 N.E.2d 322 (1942).
43. Id. at 154, 43 N.E.2d at 323.
44. Id. at 155, 43 N.E.2d at 324.
45. Id. at 155-56, 43 N.E.2d at 323-24.
46. Id. at 156-57, 43 N.E.2d at 324.
47. Id. at 157, 43 N.E.2d at 324.
48. Id. at 161, 43 N.E.2d at 326.
49. Id.
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loss to the corporation, both or either, [was] unimportant in the- absence of a breach of duty." 50 The fact that they had kept the agreement secret from the shareholders was likewise not important. A director's failure "to disclose an entirely irrelevant fact, or, even its active
concealment would not impose a liability to the corporation or its
shareholders." 51
This reasoning was logically related to the concept of loyalty. Albeit secretly, the directors were doing the opposite of breaching their
duty. Their agreement to commit their best efforts to repay the debt
owed to the bank actually manifested their loyalty to the company.
They simply agreed to put forth their best efforts to help rescue the
company from a large debt. The directors' actions were therefore
deemed not to constitute disloyalty.
In Gruber v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.,52 the directors of
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. (C&O) had agreed to pay a resigning vice-president $20,000 for an immediate release of his stock
option which had a market value of only $9,000. 53 The defendant directors asserted that the original stock option plan was designed to induce
employees to remain with the company, but the reserve of "112,500
shares to be used exclusively for incentive purposes" would have been
exhausted unless options lapsed or participants otherwise released their
option rights." "[T]he value of immediately securing additional shares
to reallocate . . . to other key [C&O] officers" as incentive for increased productivity and profits, coupled with the gain of the net worth
of the stock from option price to market price, was within the realm of
the directors' discretion.5 5 The court agreed with the directors' position,
noting that the transaction lacked any element of "fraud or misconduct
amounting to a breach of trust." 56s The court recognized no need to

50. Id. at 162, 43 N.E.2d at 326.
51. Id. at 158, 43 N.E.2d at 325. The secrecy element was affirmed in Ohio Drill & Tool
Co. v. Johnson, 361 F. Supp. 255, 262 (S.D. Ohio 1973) ("[1]f all material facts are disclosed to
the corporate shareholders and, acting upon such disclosure, they approve or ratify the officer's
actions, there is no liability."). (emphasis added), vacated in part and remanded, 498 F.2d 186
(6th Cir. 1974), affid in part, modified in part and remanded, 625 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1980).
52. 158 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
53. Id. at 602-03. The vice-president's option rights were to purchase shares accrued to him
at resignation at the price of $36.125 per share. Id. at 602. He "had three months from the date
of his resignation to exercise this option." Id. The market price on the date of his resignation was
$39.125 per share. Id. "The plaintiffs allege[d] that, [since] the difference between the market
price and the option price was $3.00 per share . . . the maximum value that could conceivably be
placed upon the release of the option rights was 3,000 [times] $3.00 or $9,000.00. . . . [T]he
C&O simply made a gift to [the vice-president] of $11,000.00." Id. at 603.
54. Id. at 603.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 604.
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impose its business judgment over that of the directors of C&O be57
cause the directors had acted in good faith.
The element of "disinterestedness" was also implicitly added to
the business judgment rule in Gruber. While courts seldom interfered
with questions of corporate management, the Gruber court opined that
the shield would be broken "where [directors] stand in a dual relationship which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment."5 Logically, when he stands in a dual capacity, a corporate director cannot
completely divorce his personal interests in a business transaction from
those of the corporation. Where a conflict of interest arises which prevents a director from exercising unprejudiced judgment, a court should,
upon the request of aggrieved stockholders, intervene and evaluate the
benefits of the transaction to the corporation." A presumption of selfdealing does not void the deal; but, where a director serves in a dual
capacity, a court should undertake a judicial fact-finding mission to determine the effects of the transaction on the corporation." Only if the
effects are determined to be adverse to the corporation, and consequently favorable to the director in another capacity, should a court
intervene and block the director's action. 1
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals termed this type of conflict of
6 2
interest to be "constructive fraud" in Seagrave Corp. v. Mount.
There, minority stockholders brought a derivative suit to block a
merger of Seagrave with another manufacturer of fire fighting equipment because of the personal interests of and substantial gain by two
directors of Seagrave.6 3
After examining the proxy statement sent to stockholders, which

57. Id.
58. Id. at 603 (quoting United Copper Secs. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S.
261, 263 (1916)). Disinterested decision-making is now considered a prerequisite to "entry into
the business judgment rule's safe harbor." A.L.I., supra note 4, at 63. Once a person challenging
the conduct of a director has met his burden of proving the inapplicability of the business judgment rule based on director self-interest, then the "burden shifts to the director to prove that the
transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation." Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d
357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); see also United Milk Products Corp. v. Lovell, 75 F.2d 923, 927 (6th
Cir.) ("It is undoubtedly true that the existence of an undisclosed personal interest taints with
suspicion the acts or advice of a fiduciary having such interest."), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 751
(1935).
59. See United Copper Secs. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1916).
60. See id.
61. Kahn v. Schiff, 105 F. Supp. 973, 979 (S.D. Ohio 1952). The court in Kahn recognized
the "shadow of suspicion" that always exists when corporate directors have interests on both sides
of a deal. Id. "But mere suspicion will not warrant a court's interference with an act of directors
within their authority and discretion, when the act is not illegal or inequitable and the company
has suffered no loss." Id. (emphasis added).
62. 212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1954).
63. Id. at 391-92.
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fully disclosed details of the proposed plan and included the names of
the directors who were to benefit, 6" the court questioned the fairness of
the plan to the Seagrave stockholders but found it was not at such a
variance with sound business judgment under existing business condi-

tions as to constitute actual fraud. 6

The court did not end its inquiry with the determination of good
faith. Because certain directors who had approved the transaction stood
to gain substantially from the deal, the court invoked the equitable doc-

trine of constructive fraud. 66 Where "acts which may have been done
in good faith, with no purpose to harm the corporation, but which are
done by a [director] who has placed himself in a position of conflict

'' 7
between a fiduciary obligation and his own private interests, 1 a court
should "take appropriate action to prevent the harm resulting from
'
68
such actions, regardless of the good intentions of the fiduciary." The
court found that the minority Seagrave stockholders were deprived of
the "impartial, unprejudiced action which the fiduciary relationship required" 6 9 because board approval of the merger was affected by direc0
tors whose personal interests overrode those of the corporation.

III.

MODERN CASES APPLYING THE COMMON LAW BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE

Transactions between two corporations having directors or officers
in common are not per se illegal or void. 7 Such transactions, however,
should "be closely scrutinized, since the presence of an agent acting in

64. Id. Under the plan, two directors of Seagrave, who were also shareholders, were to
receive $20.00 per share for the sale of their Seagrave shares to a party involved in the merger. Id.
This price was "approximately one-third higher than the current market on the New York Stock
Exchange." Id. at 393. "The high and low sales prices on the New York Stock Exchange on
August 22, 1942, for Seagrave common stock was $15.00 and $14.50, respectively." Id. In addition, the three directors not amongst the majority, who constituted the active management of
Seagrave and thought their resignations would be sought, were given continued employment under
the plan. Id.
65. Id. at 395.
66. Id. at 397.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104, 114 (S.D.
Ohio 1963) ("A fiduciary's duty includes the dedication of his uncorrupted business judgment for
the sole benefit of the corporation in any dealing which may adversely affect it."), affid. 337 F.2d
949 (6th Cir. 1964).
70. Seagrave, 212 F.2d at 397.
71. See Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 361 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Ohio 1973)[hereinafter
Ohio Drill & Tool Co. 1],vacated in part and remanded, 498 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1974)[hereinafter Ohio Drill & Tool Co. I1], afd in part, modified in part and remanded, 625 F.2d 738 (6th
Cir. 1980)[hereinafter Ohio Drill & Tool Co. II]; see also United States Rolling Stock Co. v.
Atlantic & G.W.R. Co., 34 Ohio St. 450 (1878).
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dual capacity . . .increases the likelihood of fiduciary abuses. ' 72 As
noted above, liability would be imposed on directors of Ohio corporations in a position of conflicting interests only where the. directors
breached a fiduciary duty.
In Ohio Drill & Tool Company I, the district court refused to
vacate a lease where the defendant was a director of both the lessor
and lessee corporations.7" The terms of the lease and the profit derived
from it were "well within reason" and did not reflect any "unfair dealing or breach of duty." 4 The district court held that the plaintiff shareholders bore the burden of proof regarding an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by a director of their corporation.7 5 The failure of the
shareholders to prove fraud or bad faith precluded the court from divesting the defendant of profits he derived from the lease. 76
The court also held that, under Ohio law, a transaction between
corporations which have directors or officers in common did not constitute a per se violation of the directors' fiduciary duty to the corporation
or make the directors liable for profits from the transaction.7 7 Liability
should only be imposed when this conflict of loyalties is accompanied
by a subsequent violation of the directors' primary duty to the corporation and its shareholders. 78 Fraud is then presumed or implied, and the
good or neutral intentions of the director are ignored. 79
Despite the fact that the defendant directors failed to disclose to
the shareholders that one director involved in the transaction "wore
hats" in both corporations, the district court determined that the failure to disclose a potential but ultimately non-detrimental conflict of
interest was extraneous and irrelevant.8 0 The court reasoned that the
lease was fair and drawn in good faith and that the corporation did not
suffer undue economic harm by the lease terms.81
On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit took exception to the district court's summation that the burden of proving the breach of fiduciary duty was on the plaintiff stockholders in this case.12 While acknowledging that plaintiff shareholders normally bear this burden, the

12. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. 1, 361 F. Supp.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 262.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see also Seagrave Corp. v. Mount,
Schiff, 105 F. Supp. 973, 976 (S.D. Ohio 1952).
80. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. 1, 361 F. Supp.
81. Id.
82. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. If, 498 F.2d at
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court of appeals reasoned that evidence of non-disclosure to stockholders of the director's involvement in the transaction, under the circum-

stances of this case, ought to shift the burden of proof on the issue of
88
fiduciary duty to the defendant directors. The court maintained that
"when a cloak of secrecy is raised concealing the self-dealing transac-

tions, the directors must prove that nothing is amiss behind the
shield." 84
The case was remanded for a determination of whether the de-

fendant director violated his fiduciary duty, on which he bore the bur-

den of proof since his self-interest was not made apparent to all interested parties. 85 The court of appeals also noted that if the director was
found to have breached his fiduciary duty for his own gain, disgorge86
ment of profits was the appropriate standard for measuring damages.
The district court on remand found that the defendant had
breached his fiduciary duty when he profited at the expense of the corporation.8" The case was once again appealed by the stockholders, but
this time on other grounds. 8
In affirming this result, the appellate court reiterated the principle

that:
When a director breaches his duty of trust and benefits at the expense of
the corporation, under Ohio law the director is liable for any profits he
received. It matters not that the director acted absent actual fraudulent
intent; as long as the director places himself in a position of conflicting
loyalties and subsequently violates his primary obligation to the corporation, liability attaches."
As Ohio Drill & Tool Co. III and its predecessors illustrate, the
protection afforded by the business judgment rule will be lifted when a
director, who owes a duty of loyalty to the corporation, has conflicting
interests in a corporate transaction that is the subject of his business

83. Id.
84. Id.; see also Nienaber v. Katz, 69 Ohio App. 153, 158, 43 N.E.2d 322, 325 (1942)
("The officer owes a certain duty to the corporation and it is his failure to perform that duty to his
own enrichment that creates the liability. The secrecy is simply the cloak under which he has
hidden his failure of duty and the personal profit he has thereby made.")
85. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. I1,498 F.2d at 195.
86. Id. at 191; see also Apicella v. PAF Corp., 17 Ohio App. 3d 245, 249, 479 N.E.2d 315,
320 (1984) (citing Ohio Drill & Tool Co. I1, 625 F.2d at 742).
87. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. II, 625 F.2d at 740.
88. Id. at 739. The diftrict court's opinion on remand was not reported. The appeal from
the remand opinion challenged the breach of fiduciary duty finding. In addition, a cross-appeal
was filed regarding the court's determination that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 10(b)(5) were not violated. Id. at 741. However, the appellate court more specifically
addressed the 10(b) and 10(b)(5) violations. Id. The plaintiffs sought to establish a state of mind
of the directors sufficient to impose liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5).
89. Id. at 742 (emphasis added).
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judgment as a director. 90 "[G]ood faith and full disclosure to shareholders do not insulate a director from liability if he has placed himself
in a position of conflicting loyalties to the corporation and his own private interest." 91
However, these cases also underscore the "general rule that directors carry the burden of showing that a transaction is fair and in the
best interests of shareholders only after the plaintiff has made a prima
facie case showing that the directors have acted in bad faith or without
92
requisite objectivity.
In Radol v. Thomas,93 the court applied this burden of proof standard to corporate control transactions.9 4 Radol involved a tender offer,
which almost always presents a potential conflict of interest for directors. The class-action suit arose out of the two-stage merger of Marathon Oil Company (Marathon) into United States Steel (USS). 5 The
stages were: (1) "a tender offer by [USS] for 51 percent of Marathon's
outstanding shares;" and (2) "a 'freeze-out merger' - a merger in
which the majority buys out the minority shareholders - with Marathon merg[ing] into [USS] as a wholly owned subsidiary, and remaining Marathon shareholders receiving bonds" on a per-share basis."
During negotiation of the merger between USS representatives
and the board of Marathon, USS agreed "to cash out Marathon employee stock 'options held by . . . upper level management at the expected average price offered by [USS] to other Marathon shareholders
.* and . . .requested that the present Marathon board be kept'intact. ' 97 The Marathon directors then "voted unanimously in favor of
recommending that the shareholders accept USS's offer." 98 The merger
was then approved by shareholder vote at a special shareholders'

90. See Id.; see also Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 257 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 903 (1986).
91. Radol, 772 F.2d at 257; see also Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th Cir.
1954).
92. Radol, 772 F.2d at 257; see also Apicella v. PAF Corp., 17 Ohio App. 3d 245, 247-48,
479 N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (1984). The court in Apicella stated:
when a shareholder acting on behalf of the corporation in a shareholders' derivative action,
alleges mismanagement as a result of interlocking dominant directors on both sides of a
contract or transaction resulting in harm to the corporation, the burden of proof is on the
directors to show that the contract or transaction is fair to the corporation.
Id.; A.L.I., supra note 4, at 6, 11 (protection of the business judgment rule is removed only "[ilf
a challenging party can sustain the burden of proving that.a director or officer was not acting
in good faith or with disinterest.
93. 772 F.2d at 257.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 246.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 249.
98. Id.
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meeting.9 9
The plaintiff shareholders brought suit alleging that Marathon's
directors had breached their fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
structuring the transaction in order to preserve their control over Marathon. More specifically, they alleged that the directors had a conflict
of interest because of USS's assurance that the Marathon board would
remain intact and USS's agreement to cash-out the employee stock
options.'
After losing at the district court level, plaintiffs appealed, challenging the validity of a jury instruction on the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by Marathon's directors. 10 1 The "plaintiffs' underlying contention [was] that, in the context of corporate control transactions the
burden of proof shifts to the directors to establish the fairness to sharethat would have the effect of retaining the
holders of any transaction
' 10 2
control."
directors'
The Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' contention and noted
"that the stock option agreement and employment assurance alone [did
not] place[] the directors in a position of conflicting loyalties" which
would shift the burden of proof to them. 10 3 The plaintiffs had to estab-

99. Id. at 250. The voting results were as follows: 55 percent of the non-USS Marathon
shareholders voted for the merger, 20 percent voted against the merger, and 25 percent abstained
or did not vote. Id.
100. Id. at 256. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of federal securities laws. Specifically,
they alleged that certain appraisals of Marathon's assets should have been disclosed to Marathon
shareholders at the tender offer stage of the transaction, and that the two-tier transaction with a
second stage merger price lower than the front-end tender offer price was illegally coercive. Plaintiffs did not prevail on any of their contentions. Id. at 255.
101. Id. at 256. The charge to the jury was as follows:
I do instruct you that officers and directors of a corporation occupy a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and to its shareholders.
A fiduciary must exercise the utmost good faith, and he must give undivided loyalty.
He must be scrupulously honest.
The exercise of the care, skill and diligence of a man of ordinary prudence dealing
with his own property as a general rule fulfills the duty of a fiduciary:
In dealing with shareholders, a corporate officer or director must disclose to them all
material facts.
A fiduciary, however, is not a guarantor or insurer. He is not liable for mistakes in
judgment made in good faith.
The fiduciary duty is not breached unless the directors committed fraud, or intentionally acted contrary to the best interest of the corporation and the shareholders.
Id. (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 257.
103. Id. There were no Ohio decisions addressing this contention so the court relied on
decisions "from other jurisdictions involving an attack on the actions of corporate directors allegedly taken for the purpose of preserving corporate control in the face of a hostile tender offer." Id.
See Pantner v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 701-03 (2d Cir. 1980); Treadway
Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980).
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lish a prima facie case demonstrating bad faith or lack of objectivity on
the part of the directors in order to shift the burden of proof and require the directors to show that the transaction was fair and in the best
interests of the shareholders. 104
The court acknowledged "that some corporate control events such
as the payment of greenmail should shift the burden of proof and invoke close judicial scrutiny."' 0 5 However, the ultimate decision on the
proposed transaction with USS was made by the Marathon shareholders. 10 6 "[Tihe fundamental principle of corporate governance that

shareholders must control decisions affecting the corporation's survival
10 7
as a legal entity," was therefore preserved.
IV.

STATUTORY EFFECT ON THE COMMON LAW BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE

The principles as applied in Radol, especially with respect to corporate control transactions, are relevant in examining the development
of Ohio statutory requirements for directors' duties of care and loyalty.
In 1980, the General Assembly amended Ohio corporation law which,
for the first time, provided a statutory statement of the good faith standard of care for directors. 0 8 Section 1701.59(B) of the Ohio Revised
Code was added to establish a good faith test for determining the responsibility of directors in the discharge of their duties.' 0 9
Section 1701.59(C) provides a standard of clear and convincing
evidence of lack of good faith to find that a director violated his duties. 110 According to the Ohio State Bar Association Corporation Law

Committee,

104. Radol, 772 F.2d at 257.
105. Id. at 258; see also Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchase and the Management Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1054-59 (1985).
106. Radol, 772 F.2d at 257.
107. Id. at 258.
108. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.'§ 1701.59(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1990):
A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of
any committee of the directors upon which he may serve, in good faith, in a manner he
reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and with
the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances.
109. Id.
110. Id. § 1701.59(C). The statute states:
For purposes of division (B) of this section:
(1)A director shall not be found to have violated his duties under division (B) of this
section unless it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that the director has not acted
in good faith, in a manner. he reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, or with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would use under similar circumstances, in any action brought against a director . . ..
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[t]he changes in division (C) are intended to make it clear that a director has the benefit of a presumption that he is acting in good faith and in
a manner he reasonably believes is in (or not opposed to) the best interests of the corporation in all cases, including those affecting or involving
a change in control or a termination of his services.""

Further, the state legislature extended the clear and convincing evidence standard, by which shareholder plaintiffs must prove that the
intent of a director was to injure the corporation or that the director
acted with reckless disregard for the corporation's best interests in or2
der for the director to liable for damages." The leniency of this provision, section 1701.59(D), towards directors is evident by the legislature's direct refusal to adopt the Delaware court's level 1 of
13
culpability-gross negligence-as set out in Smith v. Van Gorkum.
The stated purpose of section § 1701.59(D) ' was to free the director
from liability for negligence "in any degree. "114
Other states have adopted statutes limiting the liability of corpo115 Various justifications exist for these
rate directors for their actions.
statutes. The first is the traditional complaint that the threat of liability
has a chilling effect on directors' entrepreneurship: "directors in general should not become paralyzed or inhibited in making business decisions because of conservative legal advice given in a climate where the

111. Id. § 1701.59 (Commentary: OSBA Corporation Law Committee) (emphasis added).
112. Id. § 1701.59(D). The statute states:
A director shall be liable in damages for any action he takes or fails to take as a
director only if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence in a court of competent jurisdiction that his action or failure to act involved an act or omission undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or undertaken with reckless disregard for the
best interests of the corporation. . . . This division does not apply if, and only to the extent
that, at the time of a director's act or omission that is the subject of complaint, the articles
or the regulations of the corporation state by specific reference to this division that the
provisions of this division do not apply to the corporation.
Id.
113. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
114. § 1701.59 (Commentary: OSBA Corporation Law Committee).
115. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 176002(B)(8)(1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1 )(West Supp. 1990); N.J.
VA.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3)(West Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1 (Supp. 1990);
CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1990).
A Pennsylvania statutory enactment permits a corporation, through its by-laws, to eliminate
personal liability of a director for monetary damages except where the director has breached the
duties of his office as they relate to the standard of care or where the breach constitutes selfdealing, willful misconduct or recklessness. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364(a) (Purdon Supp.
1990). These provisions in the by-laws are, however, subject to shareholder approval. Id.
Indiana's response to the director liability crisis is even more tolerant of breaches of duty by
directors. The Indiana statute provides that a director shall not be liable for any action taken as a
director or any failure to take any action unless the breach or failure to perform his duties constitutes willful misconduct or recklessness. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 1990).
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fear of litigation over alleged due care violations unduly clouds board
deliberation."" 6 After all, excessively risk-averse directors may in fact
injure shareholders because of their timidity.
Further, shareholders generally hold portfolios of stock and are in
a position to bear as much or as little risk as they desire. If directors
are permitted to be bold without the threat of litigation and shareholders diversify their portfolios (as most do), then shareholders can allocate the risk of a breach of fiduciary duty by a director among many
corporations. This decreases the chances that one director's breach of
duty will substantially harm them. "Shareholders with a diversified'
portfolio would do best if every corporation they invest in would maximize its expected gain instead of minimizing its risks. That would maximize the returns to shareholder portfolios."' 1 7
Statutes, such as Ohio's, are also justified by the belief that courts
should not review business judgments because of their lack of expertise
in the business world and the burden such scrutiny would place on the
judicial system." 8 This concern is accompanied by a fear that judges
faced with complex litigation will be confused or blinded by the bright
gleam of hindsight." 9 Moreover, in corporate decision making, the deterrent effect of the threat of litigation can also be better achieved by
peer pressure, public disclosure, and the market for corporate
control. 2 '
The Ohio statute bases liability on clear and convincing evidence
of a director's intent to injure the corporation or his reckless disregard
for the corporation's best interest and was a culmination of all of these
justifications. It is unlikely that a plaintiff will be able to break the
shield of the business judgment rule and prevail under this standard
because of the subjectivity of interpreting such terms as "reckless" and
the difficulty of proving intent or reckless disregard by clear and convincing evidence. The net result will be fewer suits brought by aggrieved shareholders and a higher level of entrepreneurship by virtually
fearless directors.
'The Ohio legislature also implicitly affirmed the ruling in Radol v.
Thomas by amending section 1701.60 to direct that, in cases of a corporate control transaction, the director becomes an interested party

116. Gelb, Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes, 61 TEMP. L.
REV. 13, 27 (1988).
117. Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkum: The Business of Judging Business Judgment,
41 Bus. LAW. 1187, 1190 (1986).
118. Gelb, supra note 116, at 26.
119. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
30 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987).
120. Id. at 34.
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21
and, as a result, loses the benefit of the business judgment rule. This
position runs contrary to judicial decisions outside Ohio, specifically
22
those of Delaware courts. The chilling effect this statute will have on
plaintiff shareholders who now face a higher burden of proof in order
to prevail in a suit against a corporate director is beyond doubt. Yet,
less litigation will have a concomitant effect on the demand for director
and officer liability insurance ("D&O insurance"), which Ohio corpo2
rations are statutorily authorized to purchase.
These enactments were Ohio's reaction to the D&O insurance crisis of a decade ago, a crisis which resulted in premiums for D&O insurance increasing over 360 percent in one year."' These statutes were
also in direct response to the flood of litigation involving corporate officers and directors. With the likelihood of a shareholder suit against a
1 25
most corporations that wanted to
board member being one-in-five,
protect against such litigation by purchasing D&O insurance faced several hurdles. They were forced to pay higher premiums, accept lower
limits of liability coverage and increased deductibles, and contend with
12 6
Corporations that could
shorter policy duration and new exclusions.
not tolerate these impediments, for financial reasons or otherwise, could
only stand by and watch the march from the boardroom as directors of
many major publicly-held corporations began to resign or not stand for
re-election 21 7rather than continue to serve with inadequate or no
insurance.
28
In 1985, the Delaware Superior Court ruled in Van Gorkum
that, with respect to a director's duty of care in Delaware, the concept
of gross negligence was the proper standard for determining whether a

121. § 1701.60 (Comment, OSBA Corporation Law Committee).
122. Id.
123. § 1701.13(E)(7). Corporations are expressly authorized to purchase and maintain
D&O insurance by the statutes of all states except Vermont. The District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico also do not have statutes authorizing such a purchase. Most jurisdictions that do permit the
purchase of D&O insurance, including Ohio, have followed the language of the Delaware statute.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1983); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.57 (Supp. 1989).
124. Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1986, at 31, col. 2.
125. Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56. The insurance crisis
received extensive media attention. See, e.g., Stevenson, Is It Safe to Be a Bank Director?. BANKWoes
ERS MONTHLY, June 15, 1986, at 13; Galante, The D&O Crisis: Corporate Boardroom
Grow, Nat'l L. J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 29, col. 3; Lewin, Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 7, 1986, at DI, col. 2; Fowler, Scarce Corporate Directors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986, at
D20, col. 1; Hilder, Liability Insurance is Difficult to Find Now for Directors. Officers, Wall St.
J., July 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
126. Special Project, Director and Officer Liability, 40 VAND. L. REV. 599, 776 (1987).
127. Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1209 (1988).
128. 488 A.2d at 858.
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judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed one. 2 ' Applying this standard, the court determined that the directors had
"breached their fiduciary duty to their stockholders (1) by their failure
to inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them
and relevant to their decision to recommend [a proposed] merger; and
(2) by their failure to disclose all material information [that a] reasonable stockholder would consider important in deciding whether to approve the [merger].' ' 0
The Van Gorkun decision sent a shock.wave through the board
rooms of corporate America, especially those companies incorporated in
Delaware, where directors faced liability for their actions based upon a
standard of gross negligence. The D&O insurance crisis worsened,
causing an increase in resignations from some boards and making the
recruitment of qualified directors more difficult.' 31
There was no need, however, for a rapid departure by directors
from the board rooms of Ohio corporations in light of the way Ohio
courts appfied the business judgment rule pursuant to the statutory enactments. Unless plaintiffs could meet the clear and convincing evidence standard3 2 in demonstrating fraud, abuse of discretion or bad
faith on the part of the directors, competent Ohio corporate directors
were virtually immune from liability for their actions as directors. 33
In all, the purpose of the 1986 amendment to the Ohio General
Corporations Law can be summed up as follows:
It is. believed to be important for corporations to be able to obtain and
retain those persons who can best serve as directors. It is also important
that the directors of corporations feel free to use their best judgment in
making business decisions that are in the best interest of the corporation
and its shareholders without undue concern for personal liability ....
129. Id. at 873. Only three other states, Alabama, Kentucky and Wisconsin, abide by a
similar gross negligence standard. See, e.g., Deal v. Johnson, 362 So. 2d 214, 218 (Ala. 1978);
King v. Livingston Mfg. Co., 192 Ala. 269, 278, 68 So. 2d 897, 900 (1915); Dunn's Adm'r v.
Kyle's Ex'r, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 134, 147 (1878); North Hudson Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Childs, 82 Wis. 460, 476, 52 N.W. 600, 608 (1892).
130. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d at 893.
131. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS §
22.02 (4th ed. 1988) (citing four comprehensive surveys conducted and announced in 1986 and
1987 for the purpose of gauging the dimensions of the D&O liability problem. The surveys were
conducted by: (1) The Wyatt Company; (2) Peat Marwick Mitchell & Company; (3) The National Association of Corporate Directors; and (4) Touche Ross & Company).
132. § 1701.59(D).
133. See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 111-12
(1979); Kreider, Corporate Takeovers and the Business Judgment Rule: An Update, I I J. CORP.
L. 633, 634 (1986). One commentator argued: " 'The chances of [directors] being held personally
liable are about as high as the chances of getting hit by lightning when you walk across the
street.' " Farrell, If Directors Are Doing Their Job, They Don't Need Insurance. Bus. WK., Sept.
8, 1986, at 61 (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., a Columbia Law School professor).
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The amendments to Sec. 1701.59 are designed to help achieve these
goals.""'

It is too early to determine whether the Ohio legislature's amendment will achieve these goals. However, some recent case law applying
the statute as amended indicates the Ohio courts will go far to maintain their non-interventionist stance with respect to decisions made by
corporate3 directors who have not acted in bad faith or with a conflict of
1
interest. 5
36
In Worth v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc.,' the Supreme Court of
Ohio affirmed the lower court's finding that "an agreement between a
corporation and its officer which guarantee[d] to the officer continued
employment or economic benefits following a change in corporate ownership [a golden parachute agreement] is not void as against public
policy."' 87 The court reasoned that the decision to enter into such an
agreement was, "like all other matters dealing with compensation of
corporate executives, within the sound discretion of the corporation's
board of directors."' ' s Since the agreement was "neither excessive nor
tainted by executive self-dealing," the court held that the agreement at
3 9
issue was valid and enforceabl.e.
A statement by Judge Wright of the Supreme Court of Ohio capsulized the state's position in light of the statutory enactments with
.respect to judicial examination of corporate decisions: "[I]t is certainly
court to second-guess the business judgment of corporate
not for this 140
executives."
V.

CONCLUSION

Ohio courts have extended broad parameters within which directors of Ohio corporations may perform their fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty to the corporation. The state's application of the business
judgment rule precludes judicial inquiry into corporate decisions that
are informed, reasoned and not arbitrary.
Ohio courts will, however, intervene in corporate decisions when
134. § 1701.59 (Comment: OSBA Corporation Law Committee).
135. See, e.g., Worth v. Huntington Bancshare, Inc., 43 Ohio St. 3d 192, 540 N.E.2d 249
(1989). But see Wing Leasing, Inc. v. M & B Aviation Inc., 44 Ohio App. 3d 178, 182, 542
N.E.2d 671, 676 (1988)("[B]ecause close corporation directors are frequently the corporate stockholders as well, courts also tend to impose a stringent fiduciary standard on such directors."); see
also I F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.20, at 31-32 (3d. ed.
Cum. Supp. 1987).
136. 43 Ohio St. 3d 192, 540 N.E.2d 249 (1989).
137. Id. at 197, 540 N.E.2d at 255.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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there is evidence of fraud, bad faith or self-dealing. Nonetheless, when
the courts do intervene, it is not for the court to determine whether
they agree with the directors' judgment; the court only determines
whether there was a reasonable basis for the directors' decision. In
most cases, the Ohio courts have determined that there was a reasonable basis for directorial action.
The Ohio legislature has amended the state's corporation law to
require parties attacking directorial action to show clear and convincing evidence of fraud, self-dealing or reckless intent to injure the corporation on the part of directors before liability will be imposed upon
them. The results of this demanding burden of proof will be two-fold:
(1) less litigation challenging directors' decisions; and consequently (2)
lower premiums and less demand for D&O liability insurance.
Directors will then have less fear of the threat of litigation and will
be more likely to take greater risks, risks they might not have taken
before the statutory enactments. However, this strengthening of the
corporate shield is at the expense of public shareholders, as it will have
a chilling effect on the shareholder who now must meet a much higher
burden of proof in order to recover against a corporate director whom
he believes has breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation.
Gordon Peter Kushner
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